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BY ANY MEANS: HOW ONE FEDERAL AGENCY IS
TURNING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY ON ITS HEAD
Clifton Cottrell *
The federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes
underlies both the “government-to-government
relationship” with Indian tribes and the imperative
that federal agencies not actively impede the
economic development and self-determination of
Indian tribes, and that they engage in meaningful
consultation when any federal undertaking might
impact tribes in a significant way.
The Honorable Sherry Treppa, Chairperson, Habematolel Pomo of
Upper Lake, 20161
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, the chairperson and leader of the Habematolel
Pomo of Upper Lake (Upper Lake), Sherry Treppa, testified before
the United States House of Representatives at a hearing titled ShortTerm, Small Dollar Lending: The CFPB’s Assault on Access to
Credit and Trampling of State and Tribal Sovereignty.2 She spoke
ardently about the economic opportunity afforded to her tribe after
a lending entity created by the tribal government began issuing
small-dollar installment loans online. In a few short years, Upper
Lake managed to expand their lending operations, creating
desperately needed jobs in the community and funding significant
social programs critical to the preservation of tribal culture,
promotion of education, and development of further economic
*

Clifton Cottrell is an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma
and a graduate of the Baylor University School of Law. He lives in central
Pennsylvania where he works as the Director of Policy and Research for the
Native American Financial Services Association.
1
Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending: The CFPB’s Assault on Access to Credit
and Trampling of State and Tribal Sovereignty: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong.
(2016) (statement of Honorable Sherry Treppa, Chairperson, Habematolel Pomo
of Upper Lake) [hereinafter Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending].
2
Id.
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opportunity. For a tribe located hours away from the nearest major
economic center, e-commerce was just the industry to restore
prosperity to the community.
On April 27, 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection
3
Bureau (CFPB or Bureau), an independent federal agency tasked
with policing financial markets, initiated a lawsuit against four tribal
lending entities (TLEs) owned and operated by Upper Lake, styled
CFPB v. Golden Valley Lending, Inc., Silver Cloud Financial, Inc.,
Mountain Summit Financial, Inc., and Majestic Lake Financial,
Inc.4 The complaint alleges violations of the federal Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) and the Consumer Financial Protection Act
(CFP Act) for unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices
(UDAAP).5 While federal regulators like the Federal Trade
Commission have relied on TILA and UDAAP (including
UDAAP’s previous form under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act) for decades, the CFPB’s lawsuit against Upper
Lake’s TLEs is monumental; the Bureau seeks to impose state usury
and licensing laws on a sovereign tribal enterprise via a dubious
enforcement statute.
Now the tribe’s lending operations are embroiled in
litigation against the CFPB while the agency possibly operates
outside the traditional checks and balances of the United States
Constitution. The unique and potentially unaccountable structure of
the CFPB, combined with the Bureau’s narrow directive, created an
agency agenda with little oversight and a dangerous interpretation
of its mission. Even in an area in which Congress expressly forbids
the agency from rulemaking, the CFPB is now seeking to
circumvent legislative intent through the use of a subjective
administrative tool called UDAAP. The result is a truly
3

The CFPB is an agency charged with supervising and developing rules for
consumer financial markets. The Bureau is housed under the Federal Reserve in
the Department of the Treasury. The CFPB enforces nineteen different
consumer finance laws.
4
CFPB Sues Four Online Lenders for Collecting on Debts Consumers Did Not
Legally Owe, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-four-onlinelenders-collecting-debts-consumers-did-not-legally-owe/
[https://perma.cc/P6RQ-S9NM].
5
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 1, CFPB v. Golden
Valley Lending, Inc., No. 17-cv-3155 (E.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2017) [hereinafter
CFPB Complaint],
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201704_cfpb_GoldenValley_Silver-Cloud_Majestic-Lake_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q686Q37].
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unprecedented legal challenge: a federal agency is attempting to
impose state laws, laws which it is forbidden from promulgating
itself, on sovereign tribal entities via a nebulous enforcement
standard. This suit not only threatens vital economic development
opportunities for an isolated tribe, but it also endangers the very
basis of tribal sovereignty and preemption of state law in Indian
affairs. It is a case that must be watched closely, not just by the
handful of scattered tribes participating in small-dollar internet
lending, but by all of Indian Country. If the courts side with the
CFPB’s interpretation of sovereign tribal status vis-à-vis state law,
sovereignty could lose all effect in tribal economic development.
One of the hallmarks of federal Indian policy in the era of selfdetermination, the extension of sovereignty to tribal commercial
activities, would be forever lost.
This article explores the unique set of circumstances that led
to the CFPB’s lawsuit against Upper Lake. Part I begins by
providing background on the Upper Lake Tribe, the CFPB, and the
Bureau’s authority to bring suit against the TLEs. Part II addresses
the complaint, recounts the alleged violations, and discusses the
history and previous efforts by federal regulators with UDAAP.
Finally, Part III analyzes some of the major tribal concerns with the
Bureau’s complaint, including preemption, sovereignty, rate
exporting, and self-determination. In a time when the majority of
tribes still struggle to provide meaningful economic opportunity in
their communities, the CFPB must not succeed in eroding the one
component of tribal sovereignty that makes e-commerce on
reservations possible.
II.

FROM THE BLOODY ISLAND MASSACRE TO THE MORTGAGE
CRISIS OF 2008: UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS OF
UPPER LAKE AND THE CFPB

The Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake, numbering only a
few hundred members in rural northern California, have
experienced a mixture of fortunes since their ancestors settled in the
Clear Lake area thousands of years ago. From near annihilation by
United States soldiers in the nineteenth century to a protracted battle
to regain federal recognition after their rancheria was terminated in
the 1950s, the tribe’s existence is a testament to perseverance in the
face of incredible adversity. Not content with simple recognition,
3

Upper Lake now boasts robust lending operations originating
millions of dollars in loans and executing over half a million credit
inquiries annually.6 The revenues generated by Upper Lake’s TLEs
help fund vital sovereign governmental functions and allow the tribe
to provide important educational and social services for its
members.
In contrast, the CFPB began its life as a concept by an
aspiring politician envisioning a powerful federal agency to oversee
the many concerns regarding consumer finance. The need for such
an agency accelerated after poor oversight of mortgage lending and
the United States banking system led to a massive collapse of
American financial institutions and the worst recession in our
country since the Great Depression. The passage of the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank)
ushered in a new era of consumer financial regulation, shifting an
incredible amount of regulatory power and autonomy to the freshly
minted CFPB. The unique management structure of the agency with
a single independent director ensured neither Congress, the
President, nor any special interest groups would have any substantial
influence on the Bureau’s operations. Further, the broad language
found in the CFP Act permitted the CFPB considerable leverage to
assert its important function as watchdog over the consumer finance
industry.
This section recounts the circumstances surrounding the
development of modern tribal government operations at Upper
Lake, as well as explains the regulatory structure supporting its
lending operations. It continues with a review of the events that led
to the formation of the CFPB and an overview of the Bureau’s
authority regarding consumer finance and tribes.
The Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake are located on the
northern upper reaches of Clear Lake in northern California. The
most recent United States census estimates the population of the
Upper Lake Rancheria at 143 residents.7 The tribe is bordered by
Clear Lake to the south and the expansive Mendocino National
Forest to the north. The nearest major metropolitan area is
Sacramento, more than two hours away by car. Upper Lake is

6

Id. at 9.
My Tribal Area: Upper Lake Rancheria, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/tribal/ [https://perma.cc/7ZWB-RLAG].
7
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hampered by the same geographic and economic isolation indicative
of Native communities across the United States.
Upper Lake can trace its roots to the area back more than
8,000 years when their ancestors settled around Clear Lake and
looked to the abundance of the surrounding marshlands for
sustenance.8 The local presence of obsidian for toolmaking
enhanced the value of the land for early inhabitants. The massive
forestlands just north of the lake saw extensive use by Yuki,
Nomlaki Wintu, Patwin Wintu, Eastern Pomo, and Northeastern
Pomo groups.9 By 1800, there were upwards of 18,000 Pomo
Indians living in California speaking seven distinct languages.10 In
1850, United States soldiers slaughtered many of the women and
children of Upper Lake in the Bloody Island Massacre, part of a
government policy to subdue California Indians and consolidate
their control of increasingly valuable lands. Only one young girl
survived the assault, hiding from troops by submerging herself in
the lake and breathing through a reed.11 The remaining tribal
members were organized onto a rancheria in 1907, one of six such
communities on the shores of Clear Lake.
The tribe’s federal recognition and trust lands were short
lived; the California Rancheria Termination Act dissolved the Upper
Lake Rancheria and effectively extinguished their federal status.12
A group of tribal members later formed the Upper Lake Pomo
Association and sued the federal government to restore their federal
recognition and trust lands. The tribe received federal recognition
again in 1979, and trust lands were restored in 2008.13 With renewed
recognition, the members of Upper Lake wrote and ratified a new
constitution in 2004.14 With restored lands and a formalized
governance structure in their new constitution, Upper Lake set about
8

The Tribe’s History and Culture, HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE,
http://www.upperlakepomo.com/forms/brochure.pdf (last visited July 2, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/KU5B-F9GF].
9
Mendocino Forest: About the Forest, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.fs.usda.gov/main/mendocino/about-forest (last visited July 2, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/R6BY-E7DY].
10
Upper Lake belongs to the Northern and Eastern language groups.
11
Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending, supra note 1, at 129.
12
California Rancheria Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619
(1958).
13
See Upper Lake Pomo Association v. Cecil Andrus, No. C-75-0181-SW (N.D.
Cal. 1979).
14
See generally HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE CONST. (2004),
http://www.upperlakepomo.com/forms/HPUL-Constitution.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2DQ-JWZS].
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asserting their sovereign rights and exploring economic
development opportunities.
For tribes located far from economic hubs or major
transportation networks, economic opportunities can be extremely
limited. Some tribal communities can rely on resource exploitation
of their lands through mining, farming, hunting and fishing, or
logging to provide jobs and revenues. The modern Upper Lake
Rancheria began about a decade ago with a transfer into trust of just
11.24 acres, too little land for timber harvesting or farming.15
E-commerce, in particular, short-term small-dollar online lending,
presented a promising industry, allowing the tribe to provide
services across the nation through a simple internet connection. The
tribe set up a TLE to lend small amounts of money, generally only
a few hundred dollars repaid in monthly installments, to needy
households across the country via the world wide web. To manage
the complex and evolving requirements of consumer financial law,
Upper Lake set off to create a robust system of regulatory controls
to guide their lending operations.
The Upper Lake TLEs are governed by an extensive set of
lending codes developed by the tribal council. In her testimony
before Congress, Chairperson Treppa noted, “This lending
ordinance prohibits tribal licensees from engaging in unfair,
deceptive, or fraudulent practices, or engaging in any consumer
financial services other than those expressly permitted under that
ordinance.”16 To oversee the enforcement of its lending code, the
tribe instituted an independent regulatory commission: “This
regulatory commission is a separate division of the Tribe’s
government, which means that it operates independently of our
tribal government. The commission has the autonomy to exercise its
enforcement authority should a lending business violate the
consumer protection laws that we established.”17
To ultimately
issue the loans, the tribal government developed a series of TLEs to
provide small-dollar installment loans to consumers online.
Four different lending operations were named in the suit by
the CFPB, and all are owned and operated by the Upper Lake tribal
government.18 Apart from the actual lending companies, the tribe
15

Short-Term, Small Dollar Lending, supra note 1, at 130 (statement of Hon.
Sherry Treppa, Chairperson, Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake).
16
Id. at 131.
17
Id. at 131.
18
CFPB Complaint, supra note 5, at 2.
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also owns a customer support center and lead generator. Lead
generators solicit business through advertising and other forms of
communication with potential customers. The Bureau’s complaint
highlights the productivity of the TLEs: “From August 2013 to
December 2013, Silver Cloud and Golden Valley originated a total
of approximately $27 million in loans and collected a total of
approximately $44 million from consumers.”19 The CFPB also pled
that Golden Valley Lending could originate 235 loans in one day,
an amount the Bureau labeled as a “large volume.”20 Between
February 2013 and June 2016, the TLEs performed over 597,000
credit inquiries on potential borrowers.21 For a tribe that only
recently recovered its federal sovereign status, e-commerce through
small-dollar online lending has been a boon to tribal social
programs. Safeguarding this vital revenue stream is another chapter
in the tribe’s fight for survival.
In contrast to the travails of Upper Lake, the CFPB has
wielded considerable power and influence in its short existence. The
Bureau was originally conceptualized by future United States
Senator Elizabeth Warren, a law professor at Harvard University of
Cherokee and Delaware descent. In 2007, she wrote an article for
Democracy Journal in which she lamented the fact that toaster
ovens received more scrutiny from federal regulators than home
mortgages.22 In a now-famous comparison, she wrote:
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five
chance of bursting into flames and burning down
your house. But it is possible to refinance an existing
home with a mortgage that has the same one-in-five
chance of putting the family out on the street—and
the mortgage won’t even carry a disclosure of that
fact to the homeowner.23
She decried the failures of federal regulators at that time, concerned
more with maintaining the soundness and profitability of the
banking and finance industries than the wellbeing of consumers.
19

Id. at 6.
Id.
21
Id. at 9.
22
Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS,
Summer 2007, http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/
[https://perma.cc/VY32-6VXU].
23
Id.
20
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Prof. Warren would go on to propose a new federal agency for
consumer finance modeled after the Consumer Product Safety
Commission.24
Warren’s new consumer watchdog would clarify and
standardize financial products, similar to how other federal agencies
had created safety consistencies in products like appliances and
automobiles. She was especially concerned about the language
financial institutions used in agreements with consumers, explaining
that “lenders have deliberately built tricks and traps into some credit
products so they can ensnare families in a cycle of high-cost debt.”25
Simplifying complexity and pressing for transparency in loan
agreements would be important factors in leveling the playing field
in consumer finance and ridding the industry of bad actors.
Barely a year from the publication of Prof. Warren’s call for
a new federal consumer finance regulatory agency, she was elected
to the United States Senate, and America encountered one of its
worst financial collapses since the Great Depression. Between the
last quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009, household net
worth declined $12 trillion.26 Nine million Americans lost their
jobs.27 Relaxed government oversight and loose underwriting in the
subprime home market played a heavy hand in triggering the
meltdown.28 Just as the domino effect of mortgage defaults and bank
failures picked up pace, the United States Department of the
Treasury finished a report outlining a new consumer protection
agency based on Senator Warren’s prior recommendations. The new
federal agency would be guided by transparency, simplicity, and
access.29 The Bureau would protect consumers from unfair,
24

Id.
Id.
26
Households and Nonprofit Organizations; Net Worth, Level (April 2017),
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TNWBSHNO [https://perma.cc/3GUZ-T7CR].
27
Consumer Spending and U.S. Employment from 2007–2009 Recession
Through 2022, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Oct.
2014), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2014/article/consumer-spending-and-usemployment-from-the-recession-through-2022.htm [https://perma.cc/666CQ5DC].
28
See Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and
the Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120
(2009) (discussing that housing bubble was caused by a combination of low
mortgage interest rates, low short-term interest rates, relaxed standards for
mortgage loans, and irrational exuberance).
29
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 63–71
25

8

deceptive, and abusive acts, promote accountability, and prevent
regulatory arbitrage.30 The agency, operating independently of the
executive branch (similar to the Securities and Exchange
Commission), would be governed by a director and board. It would
retain supervisory and enforcement authority over nonbank
financial institutions and would coordinate enforcement efforts with
the states.31 The major federal legislation written to arrest the
mortgage crisis, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, would borrow heavily from Senator Warren’s paper
and the Treasury report.
The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 established the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau with the responsibility to regulate
consumer financial products and services and enforce consumer
protection laws.32 The CFP Act deviated in a major way from the
Treasury’s recommendations regarding management structure; the
final legislation established only a single director to oversee the
Bureau’s operations. Further, the CFPB’s director can be fired only
for cause, which includes “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.”33 President Obama chose Ohio Attorney
General Richard Cordray to serve as the first director of the Bureau
for a term of five years. His appointment was not without
controversy. Cordray was originally nominated to the post in 2011,
a year after Dodd–Frank created the agency. After uproar over the
president’s use of his recess appointment authority sparked
Republican outrage and a lawsuit,34 Cordray was finally confirmed
by the Senate in 2013.35 The director and his agency have been under
fire ever since.
For many reasons, the CFPB has come under considerable
scrutiny and consternation from federal courts and legal scholars.36
(2009), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/54K8-SBP2].
30
Id. at 57.
31
Id. at 59–61.
32
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a)
(2012)).
33
12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012).
34
See State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
35
See Megan Slack, Senate Confirms Richard Cordray as Consumer Watchdog,
THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (July 17, 2017, 6:46 PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/07/17/senate-confirms-richardcordray-consumer-watchdog [https://perma.cc/6N26-YWJG].
36
See, e.g., PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (single,
independent director structure of agency violates separation of powers
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Originally, officials envisioned a structure for the Bureau that
avoided capture by special interest groups and other corrupting
influences. At the time of its formation, there were massive amounts
of campaign contributions and other considerations funneling from
the finance and banking industries to politicians.37 An independent
agency structure would shield Bureau officials from the influence of
politics and industry in fulfilling the CFPB’s mission. Dodd–Frank
opted for a single director to head the agency, eschewing the
Treasury’s recommendation to also include a governing board. The
CFP Act further bucked trends by giving the director of the CFPB
broad policy powers in the form of rulemaking, supervision, and
enforcement, breaking from the more traditional market monitoring
functions of independent agency directors at the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Food and Drug
Administration.38 Dodd–Frank went even further by exempting the
CFPB from the Congressional appropriations process, instead
setting aside a significant portion of the Federal Reserve’s annual
budget to be used for whatever purposes were desired by the
Bureau’s director.39 The totality of these choices did not just
construct an agency insulated from political and financial influence,
it also forged an agency with a narrow mission, substantial funding,
and little accountability to the president or Congress.
To add to the Bureau’s massive coffers and independence,
Dodd–Frank bestowed upon the CFPB extensive supervisory,
enforcement, and rulemaking authority. In general, the Bureau
“shall seek to implement and, where applicable, enforce Federal
consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that
all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial
products and services and that markets for consumer financial
products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”40 The
CFPB fulfills its purpose through market monitoring, enforcement
enumerated in the U.S. Constitution), reh’g en banc granted, order vacated
(Feb. 16, 2017); Brenden Soucy, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
The Solution or the Problem?, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 691 (2013); Eric Pearson,
A Brief Essay on the Constitutionality of the Consumer Finance Protection
Bureau, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 99 (2013).
37
Pearson, supra note 36, at 103.
38
Todd J. Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or
Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 874 (2013).
39
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1017, 124 Stat. 1376, 1975 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5497 (2012)).
40
Id. at § 1021(a), 124 Stat. at 1979–80.
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against unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices, financial
education programs, and rulemaking that complements existing
consumer finance laws. One important limitation on the CFPB is a
prohibition on the agency from enacting any type of usury or interest
rate limit for credit offered by a “covered person” under the CFP
Act.41 Before proceeding to the CFPB’s complaint against Upper
Lake’s TLEs and discussion on the Bureau’s authority in that
instance, it is first important to review another pending case where
the CFPB is attempting to exert its authority over another group of
TLEs.
Great Plains Lending v. CFPB concerns the Bureau’s use of
civil investigative demands (CIDs) while exploring potential
violations of consumer finance laws by TLEs associated with the
Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Oklahoma, the Chippewa Cree Tribe, and
the Tunica-Biloxi Tribe.42 The Ninth Circuit recently heard an
appeal in the case centering on whether tribal governments and their
sovereign economic subdivisions are “covered persons” under the
CFP Act, and thus subject to CIDs.43 When the CFPB originally
sought to engage the TLEs through a CID, the tribes instructed the
TLEs not to comply, instead offering to oversee any investigations
via their tribal regulatory agencies. In federal court, the TLEs argued
that since the CFP Act treats states, defined to include federally
recognized Indian tribes, as co-regulators with the CFPB of federal
consumer financial laws, the CFPB lacked the jurisdiction to
regulate TLEs directly without the cooperation of tribal regulators.44
The court rejected this argument.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the CFP Act was a law of
general applicability.45 In doing so, the three exceptions developed
in Donovan v. Couer d’Alene Tribal Farms46 were applied to resolve
whether the CFP Act would ultimately be imposed on the TLEs. The
court explained that a law of general applicability will apply to a
tribe unless:

41

Id. at § 1027(o), 124 Stat. at 2003.
CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, 846 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that
the CFP Act is a law of general applicability and applies to tribes in the manner
of civil investigative demands by the agency).
43
Id. at 1053.
44
Id. at 1050.
45
Id. at 1051.
46
See Donovan v. Couer d’Alene Tribal Farms, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir.
1985).
42
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(1) the law touches exclusive rights of selfgovernance in purely intramural matters; (2) the
application of the law to the tribe would abrogate
rights guaranteed by Indian treaties; or (3) there is
proof by legislative history or some other means that
Congress intended the law not to apply to Indians on
their reservations.47
Finding that none of the exceptions applied in this instance, the
Ninth Circuit held that the CFP Act applied to TLEs in the issuance
of CIDs.48 The TLEs have expressed their desire to appeal this
decision to the United States Supreme Court and were recently
granted an extension to file a petition for writ of certiorari.49
Depending upon the outcome of the Great Plains case at the United
States Supreme Court, the CFPB may find itself arguing the
applicability of the CFP Act to Upper Lake’s TLEs before a district
court in Illinois.
Both the Upper Lake Pomo and CFPB experienced
tremendous growth over the past few years. The tenacity of Upper
Lake’s members helped the tribe regain federal recognition, trust
lands, and sovereign power to provide for their people through
e-commerce. On the other side, almost overnight the CFPB went
from a pipe dream by a law-professor-come-consumer-advocate to
a powerful, independent federal agency with incredible statutory
authority and deep pockets because of a major financial crisis. The
CFPB is now placing its immense resources into a unique challenge
to the economic activity of a sovereign tribal nation. The arguments
put forth by the CFPB are unprecedented and warrant examination.
III.

A COMPLAINT NEVER BEFORE SEEN IN
INDIAN COUNTRY

The CFPB alleges two major violations in its initial
complaint against the Upper Lake TLEs. First, the Bureau alleges a
violation of the Truth in Lending Act.50 Next, the CFPB argues the
tribal lending operations participated in unfair, deceptive, and
abusive acts or practices by collecting on loans in states in which the
47

Id. at 1116.
See CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, 846 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2017).
49
Id., petition for cert. filed (Aug. 3, 2017).
50
CFPB Complaint, supra note 5, at 9.
48
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TLEs failed to secure state lending licenses and charged annual
percentage rates (APR) higher than the state usury cap permits.51
This section reviews the history behind TILA and UDAAP in
relation to the CFPB’s complaint, focusing particularly on how the
agency is utilizing UDAAP to impose state laws the Bureau itself is
forbidden from developing.
TILA appeared in the late 1960s as a way to standardize loan
disclosure forms.52 It requires a clear disclosure of certain loan
terms, most importantly the APR of the product. One would expect
that a law with such a simple purpose would be simple in and of
itself, especially considering Senator Warren’s deep concern that
banks and lenders use loan terms to “trick and trap” consumers.
Unfortunately, TILA is anything but simple. Congress has amended
TILA more than twenty times since its inception; the law spawned
more than 10,000 lawsuits in its first decade of existence.53 The law
itself now covers fifty pages. The implementation rule for TILA,
Regulation Z, has been amended at least fifty times and garnered
more than 1,500 agency interpretations.54 TILA regulations and
guidance are a far cry from the transparency that stood as a hallmark
principle during the development of the CFPB.
In its complaint, the Bureau explained that the Upper Lake
TLEs failed to disclose the APR until the final loan agreement,
giving the borrowers only a more generalized estimate of financing
costs through advertisements and websites.55 The TLEs expressed
the interest in terms not based on APR, but by “generally
describ[ing] the finance charge for each installment payment as a
block rate of $30 per $100 of principal, a 30% finance charge, or the
total amount the consumer would have to repay.” Regardless of the
outcome on rate disclosures, it is the Bureau’s UDAAP allegations
that potentially carry a more significant impact to how Indian
Country conducts business.
UDAAP stands for unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or
practices. It is the CFPB’s general enforcement tool for unlawful
behavior by financial institutions outside the nearly twenty federal
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laws that regulate online small-dollar lending. UDAAP’s origins
date back more than a century, getting its start during the trustbusting years prior to World War I. Although originally intended to
stamp out anti-competitive behavior in industry, the CFPB has
managed to morph UDAAP into an anti-sovereignty weapon.
UDAAP in its modern form, minus the abusive part, dates
back to amendments to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act in 1938, prohibiting “unfair methods of competition in
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts in or practices in
commerce.”56 However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
another independent federal agency with broad powers over
consumer protection and anti-competitive business practices,
pressed some authority over unfair business practices back to the
agency’s infancy in the early twentieth century. When the FTC was
established, Congress declined to delineate an exhaustive list of
unfair behavior, leaving the FTC to issue guidance on the topic.57
The FTC was and remains governed by a five-member board.58 The
FTC’s authority under the FTC Act was deliberately left vague by
Congress because it would be too difficult to list every unfair
practice, allowing businesses to easily evade regulation through
loopholes. Lacking a precise definition, it was left to the agency and
the courts to determine the term’s meaning through the gradual
process of inclusion and exclusion.59
To define “unfair” and “deceptive,” the CFPB borrows
heavily from past FTC guidance on the terms.60 Section 1061 of
Dodd–Frank transfers all of the powers, guidance, and rules
developed for consumer financial protection by the FTC to the
CFPB, including the original UDAP under the FTC Act.61
Alternately, the FTC retains the authority to enforce any rules
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related to the FTC Act promulgated by the CFPB. Under Dodd–
Frank, prior interpretations of the FTC Act by the FTC will still
receive deference from federal courts.62 While this massive transfer
of authority and prior guidance on UDAAP ensured consistency
between FTC’s UDAP and CFPB’s UDAAP, it also means that the
CFPB is relying upon interpretations of a statute that are decades old
in many cases, lagging significantly behind the modern business
practices associated with online lending and financial technology.
Since the CFPB has asserted violations of each part of UDAAP, the
three different provisions will be examined independently.
A. Abusive
Abusive acts or practices is a new standard only added
during the creation of the CFPB in the Dodd–Frank Act. As such,
the Bureau has yet to proffer any guidance on the meaning of
“abusive” outside its statutory definition, and Director Cordray
remains vigilant in refusing to issue agency guidance on UDAAP
provisions.63 Section 1031(d) of the CFP Act reads as follows:
(d) ABUSIVE.—The Bureau shall have no authority
under this section to declare an act or practice
abusive in connection with the provision of a
consumer financial product or service, unless the act
or practice—
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a
consumer to understand a term or condition
of a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of—
(A) a lack of understanding on the
part of the consumer of the material
risks, costs, or conditions of the
product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to
protect the interests of the consumer
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in selecting or using a consumer
financial product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the
consumer on a covered person to act
in the interests of the consumer.64
The abusive standard focuses on a consumer’s ability to understand
the risks and costs associated with a financial product. It has been
likened to the old and highly subjective “unconscionability”
standard that has fallen out of favor with courts.65 The abusive
provision could create a higher duty of care regarding the types of
products and services offered by companies, but without guidance it
is impossible to determine just what purpose the standard ultimately
serves.
In its complaint, the CFPB relies heavily upon the TLEs’
purported violations of state usury and licensing laws to satisfy the
materiality and consumer lack of understanding provisions in the
abusive standard. The CFPB argued, “Consumers residing in the
Subject States likely were unaware that Defendants lacked the legal
authority to collect the loans because the loans violated usury and
licensing laws in those states.”66 By relying upon the alleged
violations of a state law that does not apply to tribes, the CFPB’s
argument for abusive acts or practices exists on uneasy footing.
With a stronger understanding of unfairness and deception, it is easy
to see why the CFPB is stretching its argument in an attempt to
regulate tribal commerce.
B. Unfairness
As the two parts of the traditional UDAP standard, “unfair”
and “deceptive” acts or practices possess a storied and extensive
history in agency guidance and federal courts. Like “abusive,”
“unfairness” is also defined in the CFP Act, but “deceptive” was left
out of Dodd–Frank and relies exclusively on FTC guidance and
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court rulings. Section 1031(c) of the CFP Act provides a basic
definition for unfairness:
(c) UNFAIRNESS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Bureau shall have
no authority under this section to declare an
act or practice in connection with a
transaction with a consumer for a consumer
financial product or service, or the offering of
a consumer financial product or service, to be
unlawful on the grounds that such act or
practice is unfair, unless the Bureau has a
reasonable basis to conclude that—
(A) the act or practice causes or is
likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers; and
(B) such substantial injury is not
outweighed
by
countervailing
benefits to consumers or to
competition.
(2) CONSIDERATION OF PUBLIC
POLICIES.—In determining whether an act
or practice is unfair, the Bureau may consider
established public policies as evidence to be
considered with all other evidence. Such
public policy considerations may not serve as
a primary basis for such determination.67
According to guidance developed by the FTC in 1980, three
standards established by the United States Supreme Court in FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson dictate the unfairness analysis.68 The Sperry
factors were first explained in a footnote in the Supreme Court’s
decision and later expanded upon by the agency.69 First, the
consumer must incur substantial harm. The FTC confirmed that
67
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substantial harm tends to be monetary, like “when sellers coerce
consumers into buying unwanted goods or services.”70 The CFPB’s
complaint expresses a tenuous connection between monetary harm
and the actions of Upper Lake’s TLEs, arguing, “Defendants caused
substantial injury by servicing, extracting payments for, and
collecting on loans that laws in the Subject States rendered void or
limited consumers’ obligation to repay.”71 The CFPB once again
relied upon the TLEs possible violations of state laws.
The second injury consideration requires that the injury to
consumers not be outweighed by consumer or market competition
benefits. In particular, the courts will review the net total outcome
between harm and benefits, only finding this factor satisfied if the
harm outweighs the countervailing benefits.72 In enforcing its
unfairness standard, the federal regulators will look for “some form
of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an
obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decision-making.”73 The
CFPB alleges that consumers lacked awareness as to whether they
were obligated to repay a loan that does not adhere to state usury
laws.74 The CFPB also pled that the injuries sustained to consumers
outweighed the benefits of the loan products but failed to elaborate
on the imbalance.
The CFPB previously brought a suit against a loan service
provider alleging unfair and deceptive acts, among other things. In
CFPB v. Intercept Corp., the federal district court in North Dakota
dismissed the CFPB’s lawsuit on summary judgment for a failure to
plead sufficient facts.75 In granting the defendant’s motion to
dismiss, the district court judge wrote:
Although the complaint contains several allegations
that Intercept engaged in or assisted in unfair acts or
practices, it never pleads facts sufficient to support
the legal conclusion that consumers were injured or
likely to be injured. Nothing in the complaint allows
the defendants or the court to ascertain whether any
70
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potential injury was or was not counterbalanced by
benefits to the consumers at issue.76
The conclusory statements by the CFPB in its complaint against the
Upper Lake TLEs echo the concerns of the North Dakota judge in
Intercept. If the consumers could not have secured credit from
another source, the CFPB may struggle to demonstrate harm to the
consumers.
Finally, the injury to consumers must be such that the
consumers could not have reasonably avoided it. The CFPB has not
pled anything specific to this component in its complaint. Coupled
with the scarce facts related to the degree of injury sustained by
consumers, the CFPB has done little to demonstrate the harm to
consumers that secured small-dollar installment loans with the
Upper Lake TLEs.
If a regulator can demonstrate that the substantial harm to
consumers is not outweighed by harm to competition, the court will
next explore public policy considerations. The regulator should ask
whether the conduct of the service provider “violates public policy
established by statute, common law, industry practice, or
otherwise.”77 This factor often helps the agency further define the
severity of the injury to consumers. Although not contained in the
complaint, the public policy considerations conflict between
consumer protection and tribal economic development. Both are
heavily memorialized in federal statutes78 and United States
Supreme Court precedent.79 The competing public policy interests
surrounding this case will leave the court with much to consider
should the CFPB advance beyond the harm factor.
The final Sperry factor relates to unethical or unscrupulous
behavior. This final factor was originally intended “to reach conduct
that violates generally recognized standards of business ethics.”80
However, as the FTC points out, “conduct that is truly unethical or
76
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unscrupulous will almost always injure consumers or violate public
policy as well.”81 Thus, the final factor is never implemented in
discussion when substantial harm is already present, and the FTC
relayed that it had no intention of using this final factor. Without
demonstrating harm in its complaint, the CFPB may strain to prove
unfairness.
C. Deception
Although the CFP Act defines the other two standards, it
does not define deceptive acts or practices. Similar to unfairness, the
CFPB instead relies on the informed standards of the FTC.82
Deception further follows a three-part test when determining a
violation. The CFPB explains, “an act or practice is deceptive when:
(1) The act or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer;
(2) The consumer’s interpretation is reasonable under the
circumstances; and (3) The misleading act or practice is material.”83
The CFPB again prefaces its complaint under the allegation that the
Upper Lake TLE loans were void under state law, thereby alleging
misrepresentations by the tribal lenders whenever they attempted to
collect on the loans.84 The overwhelmingly conclusory statements
about harm, misrepresentation, and disclosures in the Bureau’s
complaint may open the door to allowing the Upper Lake TLEs to
seek an Intercept-style dismissal on summary judgment for a failure
by the agency to plead sufficient facts.
It is the CFPB’s use of state law against sovereign tribal
entities through its UDAAP powers that makes this case so troubling
for Indian Country. As centuries of Supreme Court precedent
demonstrates, both the practice of rate exporting and principles of
tribal sovereign immunity would protect the TLEs from suit by
various state attorneys general for similar violations. However, by
funneling state law through a federal enforcement statute, the CFPB
has ignited a new debate on the preemption of state law and tribal
self-determination.
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IV.

A NEW WRINKLE IN THE DEBATE OVER TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY

The genesis of federal Indian law comes from Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Marshall’s explanation of state authority
over Native affairs in Worcester v. Georgia, where he surprisingly
declared that the laws of Georgia had no force in Cherokee
territory.85 Preemption is at the heart of the sovereign status of tribal
nations. While jurisprudence has slightly modified this rule over the
past two centuries, it still stands as a fundamental tenet of federal
Indian law. Equally applicable, but not unique to Indian law, is the
concept of rate exporting—a permissible practice by creditors for
decades and one that is typically exempt from UDAAP challenges.
However, the lack of a comprehensive regulatory statute for tribal
lending similar to gaming (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act) or
banking (National Banking Act) may cast just enough doubt for the
court to forge a new path in the online lending industry. Finally this
section looks at how tribal sovereignty applies to commercial
activities and how a failed attempt at forum shopping by the CFPB
almost circumvented these established practices.
Considering the CFPB is using the purported violation of
state usury laws against sovereign economic subdivisions of a
federally recognized tribe to impute an infringement of federal
consumer protection laws, it is best to begin by reviewing the
preemption of state law as it relates to tribal affairs. Worcester v.
Georgia, a case stemming from the Georgia imprisonment of a
missionary for entering the Cherokee Nation, is the seminal decision
on preemption. Worcester, a resident of Vermont, received approval
from the federal government and permission from the Cherokee
Nation to enter the tribe’s lands and serve as a missionary to the
Cherokee people.86 The discovery of gold in Cherokee territory
shortly before Worcester’s arrival led the Georgia State legislature
to pass a series of laws that extinguished Cherokee claims to the
land, divided up the territory, and brought it under Georgia law.87
Worcester received four years of hard labor for entering Cherokee
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territory in violation of Georgia law, and he petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for his release.88
Chief Justice John Marshall began the Court’s opinion by
recognizing the tribe’s claim to possession of the land. He wrote that
the Cherokees were “the undisputed possessors of the soil, from
time immemorial.”89 With that possession followed a number of
rights exclusive to the tribe at the exclusion of state interests. Chief
Justice Marshall placed a stop on Georgia’s attempted takeover of
Cherokee lands; he wrote definitively that:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community
occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia
have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of congress.90
Worcester was ordered released from prison, and Georgia lost any
pretext that it might hold dominion over the Cherokee people and
their homelands.91 While subsequent courts hesitated to disturb
Marshall’s proclamation in Worcester, modern preemption analysis
is less absolute and more fact specific.
Modern preemption analysis starts with Williams v. Lee.
Lee, a non-Indian, owned a general store on the Navajo Nation
reservation and sold some goods on credit to Paul and Lorena
Williams.92 He brought suit in Arizona state court when the
Williamses failed to pay.93 Because the suit involved at least one
non-Indian party, the Arizona state court concluded it had
jurisdiction to hear the suit.94 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the opinion explained that Congress had not
authorized state jurisdiction over suits arising from a non-Indian
suing over reservation activity.95 Discussing the effects of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, the Court found that tribes were
88

Id. at 540.
Id. at 559.
90
Id. at 561.
91
Id. at 562–63.
92
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 222.
89

22

discovering the fullest extents of their own jurisdictions by forming
centralized governments and establishing tribal courts.96 The
Supreme Court ultimately held that state law could not be applied to
reservation activity if it interfered with a tribe’s right to make its
own laws.97 Lee’s suit could not be tried in Arizona state court.
Fifteen years later the Supreme Court added another layer to
preemption analysis in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission.98 In McClanahan, the state of Arizona withheld
$16.20 in taxes from the wages of a Navajo citizen that lived on the
Navajo reservation and derived all of her income from reservation
sources.99 The lower courts examined the case based on the Williams
v. Lee standard.100 On the narrow question of whether a state tax is
permissible on tribal citizens who earn all of their income from
reservation sources, the Supreme Court held that state law would
only apply if: (1) the law did not interfere with tribal selfgovernment; and (2) the suit involved a non-Indian.101 The Court
declined to impose the tax on the Navajo citizen, and the preemption
analysis earned a second consideration.
As tribal governments expanded their influence and flexed
their sovereign muscles on reservation lands, states continued their
efforts to chip away at tribal jurisdiction. In New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, New Mexico sought to apply its own
hunting and fishing regulations to non-Indians conducting these
activities on tribal land.102 The tribe developed its own game
management plan with the federal government and set its own rules
for hunting and fishing on tribal lands that promoted its management
plan.103 New Mexico game wardens began arresting non-Indians for
practices that violated state hunting and fishing laws but followed
tribal regulations. The Supreme Court determined that “the exercise
of state authority which imposes additional burdens on a tribal
enterprise must ordinarily be justified by functions or services
performed by the State in connection with the on-reservation
activity.”104 Since the tribe already had regulations and a
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management plan in place that supervised the activities of nonIndians, state interference was unwarranted. The value generated on
the reservation through hunting and fishing favored the preemption
of state law.
As more tribes entered the gaming industry in the 1980s,
states became increasingly resistant to casino operations and many
sought to block tribal gaming. The Supreme Court’s decision in
California v. Cabazon was not just another preemption decision; it
ushered in a new era of tribal economic development.105 California
attempted to stop the tribe from offering bingo and poker games on
the reservation. The state had a law that limited bingo to charity
promotions staffed by volunteers.106 Since the California law sought
to regulate bingo instead of prohibit the game, the Supreme Court
decided that the state law was civil in nature and outside the scope
of California’s participation in Public Law 280.107 The state lacked
the authority to regulate gaming on reservations. In fact, it was the
policy of the federal government to encourage reservation economic
development opportunities like gaming, not limit them.108 Later
Supreme Court opinions on gaming only reinforced this policy.109
Despite almost two centuries of Supreme Court jurisprudence
related to preemption, some forum shopping by the CFPB
threatened to ignore this invaluable precedent in favor of case law
that sought to undermine preemption.
Jackson v. Payday Financial is a 2014 decision in the
Seventh Circuit, the same jurisdiction in which the CFPB filed its
suit against the Upper Lake TLEs. In Payday Financial, the circuit
court found that state lending laws applied to a loan transaction
between a private tribal citizen’s lending operation and an Illinois
resident.110 Payday Financial was a lending entity owned and
operated by a private tribal citizen based on the Cheyenne River
Sioux Reservation.111 The loan agreement required that disputes be
settled with tribal law through arbitration led by either a tribal elder
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or a three member panel made from the tribal council.112 The court
found that none of the tribal elders or council members had any
experience resolving disputes through arbitration. In one instance
the tribal elder appointed to serve as arbitrator was the father of an
employee at the lending business.113 The court determined that the
arbitration clause was illusory, since there was no way a borrower
could receive a reasonable arbitration hearing under the terms of the
loan agreement. The court lamented:
Although the contract language contemplates a
process conducted under the watchful eye of a
legitimate governing tribal body, a proceeding
subject to such oversight simply is not a possibility.
The arbitrator is chosen in a manner to ensure
partiality, but, beyond this infirmity, the Tribe has no
rules for the conduct of the procedure. It hardly
frustrates FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] provisions
to void an arbitration clause on the ground that it
contemplates a proceeding for which the entity
responsible for conducting the proceeding has no
rules, guidelines, or guarantees of fairness.114
The judge voided the loan agreement, but chose to take the ruling
one step further. Not content with simply nullifying the borrower’s
obligation to repay the loan, the court insisted on wading into
dangerous waters concerning preemption and the expression of
tribal sovereignty. The Seventh Circuit wrote:
Here, the Plaintiffs have not engaged in any activities
inside the reservation. They did not enter the
reservation to apply for the loans, negotiate the loans,
or execute loan documents. They applied for loans in
Illinois by accessing a website. They made payments
on the loans and paid the financing charges from
Illinois. Because the Plaintiffs' activities do not
implicate the sovereignty of the tribe over its land
and its concomitant authority to regulate the activity
112
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of nonmembers on that land, the tribal courts do not
have jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims.115
Relying somewhat on the preemption analysis espoused in
McClanahan, the court bypassed preemption and the principle of
rate exporting to place the loan transaction in Illinois and under state
law. This dicta could have had a major impact on how the Upper
Lake case is tried and on future litigation involving tribal lenders in
the Seventh Circuit, but a timely transfer of venue to Kansas should
mitigate the potentially harmful dicta. Further, a number of
differences between the two cases could distinguish them enough to
make the dicta in Jackson inapplicable to Upper Lake.
Before contrasting Jackson with the current Upper Lake
complaint, it is first necessary to explain the unique position tribal
governments occupy in local economic development efforts. Native
Americans are only referenced once in the United States
Constitution, under the power of Congress “To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”116 As the earliest trade partners to American
colonists, tribes established vital business relationships with
European settlers for guns, tools, livestock, and horses. Through
hundreds of treaties, foreign powers and later the United States
recognized the sovereign rights of the various tribes scattered across
North America. Once Chief Justice Marshall distilled the essence of
tribal sovereignty through the courts, Indians began slowly using
their unique status to spur economic opportunities and provide for
their communities. Tribes were left with a certain degree of
autonomy to create their own governments, exercise immunity from
suit, and develop jobs for tribal citizens via tribally owned
enterprises.
An important consideration in tribal economic development
is the transfer of sovereign immunity to tribally owned businesses
by the tribal government. This extra layer of protection helps tribes
self-determine their future for residents without fear of constant
legal challenges draining tribal resources away from other pressing
reservation needs. The principles of sovereign immunity afforded to
tribal businesses are historically supported by federal policy and the
Supreme Court. Supreme Court decisions extend immunity to tribal
115
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business activity on and off reservation.117 But as Payday Financial
discovered, not every tribal business garners immunity, and courts
across the nation have begun using an “arm of the tribe” analysis to
determine which entities deserve sovereign protections. Coupled
with modern jurisprudence regarding rate exporting, the Upper Lake
TLEs could escape the fate of the lender in Jackson by
demonstrating their arm-of-the-tribe status and promoting Supreme
Court precedent regarding off reservation commercial activity.
Kiowa v. Manufacturing Technologies marked a watershed
moment for defining the sovereign powers of tribally owned
commercial activity. The Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma agreed to
purchase stock in Manufacturing Technologies via a promissory
note for $285,000.118 The contract was actually signed in Oklahoma
City, miles away from Kiowa lands.119 Although the agreement did
not limit the tribe’s sovereign immunity, the tribe defaulted and the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals found that the tribe could be sued
in state court for commercial activity occurring off-reservation.120
The United States Supreme Court took a different approach to offreservation commercial activity.
Before ruling, the Supreme Court distinguished between the
right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available
to enforce them.121 The state had the authority to tax cigarette sales
for instance, but lacked the power to collect those taxes from the
tribe and ultimately held that the tribe was immune from suit for offreservation commercial activity.122 Again, the Supreme Court left
any changes to this principle to Congress.123 As the branch of
government constitutionally charged with regulating commerce
with tribes, only Congress retained the power to abrogate tribal
immunity in commercial matters.
Despite its holding, the Supreme Court did provide a word
of caution to non-Indian parties seeking to conduct business with
tribal entities. The majority wrote, “In this economic context,
immunity can harm those who are unaware that they are dealing with
a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who have no choice
117
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in the matter, as in the case of tort victims.”124 This concern is likely
assuaged in the Upper Lake case. For instance, Golden Valley
Lending provides a disclaimer on the homepage of its website
informing consumers that it is “owned and operated by Golden
Valley Lending, Inc., a tribal lending entity wholly owned and
operated by the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake, California,
which is a sovereign nation located within the United States of
America, and is operating within the tribe's reservation.”125 The
CFPB even pled that the loan agreements clearly state that loans
originate on tribal land and are governed by tribal law, regardless of
residence of borrower.126 The TLEs also provided a mailing address
to the tribe’s regulatory commission for borrowers to send
additional questions or concerns. For instance unlike a tort case in
which a tribal employee hits a non-Indian with a company vehicle,
the consumers are given notification of the tribe’s interest in the TLE
and many of the legal ramifications of accepting the loan. It is
unlikely the concerns of the court in Kiowa would be present in the
Upper Lake case.
The Supreme Court revisited its decision in Kiowa in 2014
in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community. In Bay Mills, a compact
with the state restricted the tribe from pursuing gaming outside tribal
lands.127 Nonetheless, Bay Mills opened a class III gaming operation
in Vanderbilt, about 125 miles from its reservation in the Upper
Peninsula.128 The tribe had bought the property in Vanderbilt with
proceeds from a federal appropriation in which “any land acquired
shall be held as Indian lands are held.”129 The Supreme Court
examined whether tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit for offreservation gaming. Since Michigan had argued the gaming
operation was outside tribal lands, the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA) did not apply.130 The state could have easily bargained
to restrict Indian gaming off reservation in its gaming compact with
Bay Mills. The Supreme Court further recognized that in the fifteen
years since Kiowa, Congress had declined to abrogate sovereign
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immunity for off-reservation commercial activity.131 Thus, the court
reinforced Kiowa and retained important tribal sovereign immunity
protections for Native economic development.
The Supreme Court pointed out in Bay Mills that tribes
followed the decision in Kiowa closely and built important business
practices around the holding. The court reasoned, “tribes across the
country, as well as entities and individuals doing business with
them, have for many years relied on Kiowa (along with its forebears
and progeny), negotiating their contracts and structuring their
transactions against a backdrop of tribal immunity.”132 With this in
mind, Upper Lake set up its loan agreements to impute its own tribal
lending code. The tribe has agreements with a few different states,
not unlike gaming compacts under IGRA, that further define their
sovereign rights and the rights of consumers in those states that enter
into loan agreements with the tribe’s TLEs.133 Through its lawsuit,
the CFPB seeks to dismantle the tribe’s considerable work in
negotiating responsible lending compacts with states and
developing its own lending code to govern operations.
Enhancing tribal efforts on self-regulation, the United States
Department of the Treasury issued a series of initiatives shortly after
the passing of Dodd–Frank aimed at promoting responsible and
sustainable lending and access to capital in Indian Country. Under
one particular initiative, the Treasury wrote:
Empowering tribal governments to enforce the
laws on reservations: Tribal governments will be
permitted to enforce the CFPB’s rules in areas under
their jurisdiction, the same way that states will be
permitted to enforce those rules. In addition, tribal
consumer financial protection codes will be
protected, so that tribal governments can set
standards that are tougher than the federal standards
to afford greater protections for their citizens under
those codes.134
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Likely with this consideration in mind, Upper Lake established an
independent regulatory commission to enforce its tribal lending
code and address customer issues. But as the CFPB demonstrated in
its CID case against other TLEs, the Bureau is unwilling to respect
tribal sovereignty in this area, the Supreme Court’s precedent in
Kiowa, or an initiative from the Treasury.
For sovereign tribal nations, their immunity extends to
economic and political subdivisions, often called “arms of the
tribe.”135 Since the Supreme Court has yet to articulate an arm-ofthe-tribe analysis, various state and lower federal courts have
developed their own methods of separating true extensions of the
tribal government from private businesses operated from tribal
lands, like in Jackson.136 At the state level, different jurisdictions
have turned to analysis of the business through some combination
of method of creation, financial relationship, and operational
relationship examination. California takes a balanced approach and
uses a five-factor test reviewing how the entity was created,
immunity sharing by the tribal government, the entity’s purpose,
tribal council control over the entity, and the financial relationship
between tribe and entity.137 Arizona places a higher emphasis on the
potential liability to the tribe if the entity is sued.138 The state of
Washington focuses on whether the entity was created and owned
by the tribe.139 There is slightly more standardization in federal
courts.
The Tenth Federal Circuit Court relies on the Breakthrough
140
factors. The Breakthrough factors closely mirror the recently
adopted California standard, except they require that “the purposes
of tribal sovereign immunity are served by granting [the entity]
immunity.”141 The Ninth Circuit follows a similar standard.142 While
few facts have been pled thus far to conduct a proper arm-of-the135
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tribe analysis, previous statements by Chairperson Treppa to
Congress tend to support the extension of sovereign immunity to
Upper Lake’s TLEs, including the tribal government’s creation of
the TLEs, the use of TLE revenues for sovereign government
functions, and TLE oversight via a tribally developed regulatory
commission.143 Further, through her concurrence in Bay Mills,
Justice Sotomayor echoed the importance of tribal economic
development to federal Indian policy: “A key goal of the Federal
Government is to render Tribes more self-sufficient, and better
positioned to fund their own sovereign functions, rather than relying
on federal funding.”144 Exerting their sovereign powers through
economic arms of the tribe is the best method for tribes to achieve
self-sufficiency.
Rate exporting is the practice by which a financial institution
is permitted to charge an interest rate commensurate with the laws
of the institution’s home state rather than the laws of the debtor’s
state. This practice is consistent with the century-old National
Banking Act (NBA) and Supreme Court precedent. However, as the
refusal of the Seventh Circuit in Jackson to recognize this practice
and impose the laws of Illinois on the loan transaction demonstrates,
the CFPB’s choice of venue might not have occurred by chance. By
angling for favorable circuit precedent in Illinois, the Bureau
attempted to nullify tribal lending laws and strengthen the agency’s
use of state law violations in their UDAAP claims.
In 1978, the Supreme Court asked in Marquette Bank v. First
of Omaha whether a bank could charge interest rates consistent with
its home state regulation if it was higher than the rates permitted by
the consumer’s home state.145 Nebraska law permitted a bank to
charge 18% interest on the first $999 charged to the credit card and
12% for the subsequent balance.146 Minnesota law capped interest
for the entire balance at 12%.147 Marquette was forced to institute a
small initiation fee to remain as profitable as Omaha. However, the
Minnesota bank began losing customers due to the fee. Omaha could
maintain profitability without the fee.148 The NBA permitted banks
143
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to charge interest rates consistent with the laws of the state where
the bank’s deposits “are to be carried on.”149 The Supreme Court
was asked to clarify a bank’s location under the NBA.
The court refused to conclude that a bank soliciting
customers in Minnesota was de facto located in Minnesota under the
NBA. The court wrote:
Although the convenience of modern mail permits
Minnesota residents to holding Omaha Bank’s
Bankamericard to receive loans without visiting
Nebraska, credit on the use of their cards is
nevertheless similarly extended by Omaha Bank in
Nebraska by the bank's honoring of the sales drafts
of participating Minnesota merchants and banks.150
And the practice of rate exporting was given the Supreme Court’s
seal of approval.
Almost two decades later, the Supreme Court again was
asked to resolve another exporting case, except this time the case
involved the issuance by a bank of late fees deemed permissible in
the bank’s home state but illegal in the customer’s home state. At
the same time as this case was being decided, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued guidance on the subject
and concluded that late fees constituted “interest” under the NBA
and were subject to the same rate export standards espoused in
Marquette.151 The Supreme Court lent deference to the agency’s
interpretation of the NBA and concluded that late fees were interest
under the NBA.152 However, the jurisprudence on rate exporting
uncovers a few potential points of contention in the Upper Lake
case.
First, there is no National Bank Act for small-dollar lending.
Whereas the National Bank Act has stood for a century, small-dollar
online lending is still in its infancy. This could make reliance on
Marquette and its progeny shaky in the face of the Seventh Circuit’s
dicta in Jackson. Further, the CFPB is afforded automatic Chevron
deference under Dodd–Frank.153 Although the agency has not yet
149
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issued any guidance on UDAAP and tribal rate exporting, there is
nothing to stop the Bureau from doing so. In fact, the OCC’s
guidance in Smiley was issued precisely because of that particular
litigation, so it is not as if the CFPB is barred from such tactics
during litigation.154 The Upper Lake TLEs have managed to fight
the unfavorable precedent in Illinois through the recent granting of
a motion to change venue to Kansas where their call center and other
ancillary services are housed.155 The move to Kansas should give
the tribal defendants more favorable precedent on rate exporting and
arm-of-the-tribe sovereign considerations.
Like so many cases involving tribal affairs, the issue of the
exercise of tribal sovereignty will be at the center of the litigation.
The established principles of preemption, arm-of-the-tribe
sovereign immunity, and rate exporting would ordinarily shield
TLEs from a suit alleging violations of state usury laws. However,
the unique nature of the CFPB’s UDAAP pleading leaves the
outcome of this case in doubt. The impacts of an adverse decision
against the TLEs could reverberate throughout Indian Country and
hamper not only the exercise of tribal sovereignty, but reservation
economic development as well.
V.

CONCLUSION

On July 10, 2017, the CFPB issued its final rule concerning
consumers’ rights to bring class action lawsuits against financial
service providers, targeting the common requirement that borrowers
agree to binding arbitration when signing the loan agreement.156 The
new rule included an exemption for tribal governments and their
“arms.”157 Although Congress would later repeal the rule through
the Congressional Review Act, this rule was a recognition at the
agency that only Congress, or a tribe through an express waiver, may
abrogate sovereign immunity from suit. Unfortunately, this
awareness is contradicted in the agency’s enforcement division,
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where it now seeks to abrogate tribal immunity from state law
through its UDAAP enforcement statute.
If a private party or even state attorney general brought this
suit, precedent is clear that it would be quickly dismissed by the
courts on preemption and immunity grounds. However, the CFPB
added a unique wrinkle to these traditional concepts of federal
Indian law by relying on a federal statute to enforce otherwise
inapplicable state laws against a sovereign tribal enterprise. Such
agency overreach was never the intent of its creator or decades of
United States Supreme Court precedent regarding rate exporting and
the lack of authority state law holds over tribes and their sovereign
functions.
For tribes like the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake,
cultural, geographic, and economic isolation have perpetuated
cycles of poverty, abuse, and despair. E-commerce represents an
opportunity for remote tribal communities to connect with the nation
at large and participate in one of the fastest growing sectors in the
national and international economy. This case will go far in
determining the future of the multi-billion dollar tribal lending
industry, as well as potentially alter tribal sovereignty for
generations to come.
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